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Abstract: 
To date, no research has investigated score predictions and anxiety interpretation in high-
anxious, low-anxious, defensive high-anxious and repressor individuals. This study examined 
Eysenck’s (1997) predictions for cognitive biases on future performance expectations in all 
four groups. This study was conducted in an ecologically-valid sporting environment. 
Competitive shooters completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the Sport 
Anxiety Scale prior to a major competition. Percentile splits identified the four 
defensiveness/anxiety groups. The modified Competitive Sport Anxiety Inventory- 2 was 
used to assess the intensity and direction of anxiety prior to competition. Participants 
predicted their expected shooting score. The hypothesis that repressors would interpret their 
anxiety as more facilitative to performance compared to low-anxious individuals was 
partially supported. Repressors were more optimistic in their performance prediction in 
contrast to defensive high-anxious performers who, in turn, were more pessimistic compared 
to the other two groupings. High-anxious performers, contrary to predictions, demonstrated 
optimism in their future performance. The findings of this study corroborate the theoretical 
predictions and the evidence from previous studies with sport performers. Future research 
should continue to investigate the influence of cognitive biases on performance predictions in 
sporting environments using Weinberger et al.’s classifications. 
 
Keywords: anxiety symptom interpretation, cognitive biases, performance prediction, 
shooting. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The effect of anxiety on sporting performance has been investigated widely over the 
years (e.g., Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007; Moore, Vine, Freeman, & Wilson, 2013). 
Limited research, however, has considered the individual differences that influence anxiety 
and associated cognitive factors, or the effect of social desirability. Situational or state 
anxiety has been proposed to have both an intensity and directional component (Jerome & 
Williams, 2000), and both symptoms are important in understanding the multidimensional 
effect of anxiety in sporting situations. Anxiety intensity reflects the severity of symptoms 
whereas the directional component of anxiety reveals the way cognitive and somatic anxiety 
symptoms are interpreted as either facilitative or debilitative to performance.  
Over the past 20 years, researchers have used the modified version of the CSAI-2 to 
assess anxiety symptoms (e.g., Hanton, Neil, Mellalieu, & Fletcher, 2008). There is, however, 
limited research examining what may cause different interpretations of these symptoms. 
Anxiety interpretation can be influenced by coping styles linked to cognitive defense 
mechanisms that are the characteristic of different personalities. Weinberger, Schwartz, and 
Davidson (1979) were the first to identify four personality profiles from trait anxiety and 
defensiveness scores: high-anxious individuals who score high on trait anxiety and low 
defensiveness; defensive high-anxious individuals who score high on trait anxiety and 
defensiveness; low-anxious individuals who score low on trait anxiety and defensiveness; and 
repressor individuals who score low on trait anxiety and high defensiveness. These different 
personality profiles have been predicted to show different coping behaviors. For example, 
Weinberger et al. (1979) reported that repressors report low levels of anxiety, whilst their 
physiological response to anxiety displays a profile similar to high-anxious individuals. In 
contrast, low-anxious individuals did not appear to demonstrate any separation between self-
report measures and physiological measures of anxiety. These findings suggest cognitive 
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factors, such as defensiveness, may moderate the anxiety response. Weinberger (1990) 
concluded that repressors report low levels of anxiety because they believe they are not 
experiencing a negative affect. Data  for defensive high anxious individuals is typically 
absent from most research populations. 
Following Weinberger et al.’s identification of these personality types, Eysenck 
(1997) proposed a four-factor theory suggesting that the emotional experience of anxiety 
depended on the processing of four sources of information: (i) the cognitive appraisal of the 
situation; (ii) an individual’s interpretation of their physiological activity; (iii) perceived level 
of behavioral anxiety; and (iv) an individual’s own cognitions, e.g., worries about the future. 
Eysenck also proposed that the four personality groups differed in dispositional anxiety as a 
result of their cognitive biases. The operation of cognitive biases has been assumed to be 
influenced by schemas stored within long-term memory. These cognitive biases operate on 
all four factors and cause individuals to either magnify or minimize threat. It is assumed that 
both attentional and interpretive biases influence the four sources of information, and depend 
on processes operating below a level of conscious awareness. High-anxious individuals are 
predicted to demonstrate both attentional and interpretive biases, which can lead them to 
amplify threat and interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening. Defensive high-anxious 
individuals were suggested to have a similar cognitive bias to high-anxious performers. In 
contrast, repressors were proposed to have opposite interpretive and attentional biases 
causing them to avoid and minimize threat and interpret ambiguous stimuli as non-
threatening. Low-anxious performers were proposed not to demonstrate any cognitive bias. 
The influence of cognitive biases has been assumed to be mediated by state-anxiety intensity, 
being most evident when state-anxiety is high. Furthermore, Eysenck’s (1997) proposed that 
the cognitive biases exhibited by high-anxious and repressor individuals also influence their 
cognitions about future events. Specifically, repressors are more optimistic in performance 
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expectations as a result of their opposite cognitive biases to avoid threat. In contrast, high-
anxious individuals are more pessimistic in performance predictions due to their interpretive 
biases, which lead them to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening.  
Numerous studies have examined the interpretation of anxiety as either facilitative or 
debilitative to performance (Lundqvist, Kentta, & Raglin, 2011). Only three research studies 
have examined Weinberger et al.’s (1979) classification of personality groupings in a 
sporting environment (Mullen, Lane, & Hanton, 2009; Jones, Smith, & Holmes, 2004; 
Williams & Krane, 1992). Jones et al. (2004) considered Eysenck’s four-factor model and 
sought to establish differences in the interpretation of cognitive and somatic anxiety as either 
facilitative or debilitative to performance in an ecologically-valid competitive golf study. 
Jones et al.’s findings partially supported the predictions of Eysenck (1997) that repressors’ 
cognitive biases led them to be optimistic in their performance predictions. No discrepancy 
was found between the actual and predicted performance for the high-anxious group. 
Unfortunately, a limitation to this study, was the lack of a defensive high-anxious group due 
to low participant numbers. To address this omission, Mullen et al. (2009) increased 
participant numbers to enable the inclusion of a defensive high-anxious group. Mullen et al.’s 
(2009) findings supported the original hypothesis that high intensity somatic anxiety was 
more debilitative to performance for high-anxious and defensive high-anxious groups. There 
were also several limitations to this study. First, the modified CSAI-2 state anxiety 
questionnaires were completed away from the competition setting and after reading an 
imagery script. The authors designed this imagery-based script to re-create the competition 
setting rather than using real sporting environments or allowing the student participants to 
create their own imagery script. Further, sporting performance was not measured and a wide 
variety of sports were used. This is of concern since performers in explosive, contact sports 
may interpret somatic anxiety intensity as more facilitative compared to athletes in fine 
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control sports such as rifle shooting where high somatic anxiety intensity is typically 
interpreted as debilitative to performance (Hanton, Jones, & Mullen, 2000).  
To date, therefore, no research has investigated score predictions and anxiety 
interpretation in all four personality groups and in an ecologically-valid, single sport 
environment. The aim of the study  was to investigate how anxiety is interpreted in high-
anxious, low-anxious, defensive high-anxious and repressor rifle shooters. We also aimed to 
investigate differences in performance predictions between the four groups. In line with Jones 
et al. (2004), it was predicted that repressors would perceive anxiety to be more facilitative to 
performance compared to high-anxious, low-anxious, and defensive high-anxious shooters. In 
addition, we hypothesized that the defensive high-anxious and high-anxious groups would be 
more pessimistic in their performance predictions, whereas the repressors would be more 
optimistic in their performance predictions. 
 
2.0 Method: 
2.1 Participants: 
185 fullbore rifle shooters (161 males and 23 females; mean age of 44 years; SD: ± 
16.5) competing in the National Rifle Association’s Imperial Meeting participated in the 
study. Participants completed a written informed consent form, and were assured of 
confidentiality and their right to withdraw at any time. The protocol was approved by the 
local Institutional Ethics Committee.  
2.2 Measures: 
The 10-item short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS; Strahan 
& Gerbasi, 1972) was used to assess defensiveness and to discriminate repressor individuals 
from low-anxious individuals, and defensive high-anxious from high-anxious individuals. 
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This questionnaire has been used consistently with research investigating Weinberger et al.’s 
personality types and has been characterized as a measure of defensiveness (Weinberger et 
al., 1979). A correlation coefficient of r = 0.9 has been reported between the 10 item MC-
SDS and the original 33 item MC-SDS with an internal consistency alpha coefficient of 0.66 
(Reynolds, 1982). 
The Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS; Smith, Smoll, & Schutz, 1990), a sport specific 
multidimensional measure of trait anxiety was used. The SAS contains 21 items and consists 
of three subscales, including five concentration disruption items, seven cognitive anxiety 
items  and nine somatic anxiety items. Respondents rate each item on a four point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). A retest reliability of 0.77 has been 
reported (Smith et al., 1990) with a Cronbach alpha of 0.86 for the cognitive subscale. 
Shooters were given Smith et al.’s (1990) instructions for completion of the form.  
The Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2: Martens, Burton, Vealey, 
Bump, & Smith, 1990) was used to measure pre-competitive state anxiety intensity and 
direction. The questionnaire comprises 27 items for anxiety intensity and direction with three 
subscales equally weighted: cognitive anxiety; somatic anxiety; and self-confidence. The 
intensity scale includes items rated on a four point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 
4 (very much so). The direction scale indicates the degree to which participants perceive their 
anxiety symptoms as either facilitative or debilitative to future performance. The direction 
scale consists of a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (very debilitative) to +3 (very 
facilitative). Martens et al. (1990) reported alpha coefficients of 0.79, 0.82 and 0.88 for the 
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self-confidence subscale respectively. 
2.3 Procedure: 
Participants completed the MC-SDS and the SAS individually one month prior to the 
competition. Percentile points (set at 33% and 66%) were used on the participants’ MC-SDS 
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and SAS cognitive sub-scale scores to identify the four personality groups; high-anxious (n= 
13), defensive high-anxious (n= 9), low-anxious (n= 10) and repressor (n= 13). Forty minutes 
to one hour prior to the competition, participants completed the modified CSAI-2 and 
predicted the score they expected to achieve in the forthcoming competition. Actual scores 
were recorded after the competition by the experimenter.  
2.4 Data analysis: 
All participants classified as either DHA or HA reported higher state anxiety intensity on the 
CSAI-2 median split compared to the REP and LA individuals thereby controlling for the 
potential moderating effect of the role of state anxiety.  Consequently, MANOVA were used 
to examine the between-group differences in self-reported state anxiety intensity and state 
anxiety direction scores with a follow-up ANOVA. A factorial MANOVA was performed on 
the modified CSAI-2 intensity scores, with personality group as the independent variable, and 
cognitive and somatic state anxiety intensity as the dependent variables. A second MANOVA 
was performed on the direction scores with personality group as the independent variable and 
cognitive and somatic anxiety direction as the dependent variables. Between-group 
differences in predicted score accuracy (predicted score-actual score) were examined by 
ANOVA. Effect sizes were calculated as Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988). 
 
3.0 Results 
3.1 Trait anxiety and defensiveness: heterogeneity check: 
A statistical heterogeneity check was performed for the four personality groups prior to the 
main data analysis to ensure they differed in trait anxiety and defensiveness. The one-way 
ANOVA for the SAS cognitive anxiety sub-scale revealed significant differences between the 
four groups, F(3, 45) = 27.248, p < 0.01. Post-hoc Tukey HSD analysis confirmed significant 
differences between the trait anxiety scores of the high-anxious and low-anxious groups (p < 
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0.05, ES= 0.9) and the defensive high-anxious and repressor groups (p < 0.05, ES= 0.8). A 
one-way ANOVA analysis of the MC-SD scores showed significant differences between the 
four groups, F(3, 45) = 19.018, p < 0.01. Post-hoc analysis confirmed significant differences 
in MC-SD scores between the defensive high-anxious and low-anxious groups (p < 0.05, ES= 
0.9) and the repressor and high-anxious groups (p < 0.05, ES= 0.9). 
 
3.2 Power analysis 
Post-hoc power analysis (Cohen, 1988) was conducted for the state anxiety intensity and 
direction data. The power analysis results for the state anxiety intensity data were; power = 
0.84 (α = 0.05; β = 0.16) for cognitive anxiety and power = 0.77 (α = 0.05; β = 0.23) for 
somatic anxiety. The power analysis results for the state anxiety direction data were; power = 
0.65 (α = 0.05; β = 0.35) for cognitive anxiety and power = 0.75 (α = 0.05; β = 0.25) for 
somatic anxiety.  
 
3.3 State anxiety intensity: 
The MANOVA showed significant between-group differences in anxiety intensity, (Wilks’ 
Lambda = 0.260, F(3, 45) = 12.808, p < 0.01). A follow-up between group ANOVA showed 
a significant difference in cognitive anxiety intensity (F(3, 45) = 31.449, p < 0.01). Post-hoc 
analysis showed the low-anxious  group differed significantly from the high-anxious  (p < 
0.01, ES= -0.7) and defensive high-anxious groups  (p < 0.01: ES= -0.8). A significant 
difference was also found between the repressors and the high-anxious (p < 0.01: ES= -0.8), 
and defensive high-anxious groups (p < 0.01: ES= -0.8). No significant differences in 
cognitive anxiety intensity were found between the defensive high-anxious and high-anxious 
groups (p > 0.05), or the repressor and low-anxious group (p > 0.05).  
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A follow-up between group ANOVA showed a significant difference in somatic 
anxiety intensity (F(3,45) = 12.287, p < 0.01). Post-hoc analysis showed the high-anxious 
group differed significantly in somatic anxiety intensity from the low-anxious (p < 0.05: ES= 
0.6), and the repressor group (p < 0.05: ES= 0.6). In addition, the defensive high-anxious 
group differed significantly from the low-anxious (p < 0.01: ES= 0.6) and repressor group (p 
< 0.01: ES= 0.6). There was no significant difference between the defensive high-anxious and 
high-anxious groups (p > 0.05) or the repressor and low-anxious groups (p > 0.05) (see 
Figure 1. )  
3.4 State anxiety direction: 
The second MANOVA showed significant between group differences for anxiety direction 
(Wilks’ Lambda = 0.555, F(3,45) = 4.564, p < 0.01). A follow-up between group ANOVA 
confirmed a significant difference within the cognitive anxiety direction data (F(3,45) = 
5.056, p < 0.05). Post-hoc analysis revealed the repressor group differed significantly in 
cognitive anxiety direction from the defensive high-anxious  (p < 0.05: ES= 0.5) and high-
anxious group (p < 0.05: ES= 0.4). No significant differences were found between the 
defensive high-anxious and the high-anxious group, or between the low-anxious and other 
three groups.  
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference in somatic anxiety direction 
(F(3,45)= 7.637, p < 0.01) with post-hoc analysis showing the repressor group differed 
significantly in somatic anxiety direction from the high-anxious (p < 0.05: ES= 0.5) group. 
The low-anxious group were significantly different to the defensive high-anxious (p < 0.01: 
ES= -0.6) and high-anxious group (p < 0.05: ES= 0.5). No significant difference was found 
between the repressor, low-anxious and defensive high-anxious group or the defensive high-
anxious and high-anxious groups (see  Figure 2.)  
3.5 Score prediction accuracy: 
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A one-way ANOVA of the score prediction accuracy data showed approaching significance 
between the four groups (F(3,45) = 2.615, p=0.06) (see Figure 3). For example, the 0.4 
difference in the repressor group, was the equivalent to 5 places in the Commonwealth 
Games. 
 
4.0 Discussion: 
This study aimed to extend the work of Mullen et al. (2009) and Jones et al. (2004), 
with the inclusion of score prediction data and the addition of the defensive high-anxious 
group with sports performers in an ecologically-valid sports environment. The first aim of 
this study was to investigate whether anxiety would be interpreted as facilitative or 
debilitative to performance in high-anxious, defensive high-anxious, low-anxious, and 
repressor fullbore rifle shooters. It was hypothesized that repressors would perceive anxiety 
to be more facilitative to performance when compared to the other three groups. The second 
aim was to investigate the differences in performance prediction between the four personality 
groups, extending the research conducted by Jones et al. (2004). Specifically, the defensive 
high-anxious and high-anxious group were predicted to be pessimistic in their performance 
predictions, whereas the repressor group were predicted to be optimistic.  
The findings of this study corroborate the theoretical predictions and the evidence 
from previous studies conducted with sport performers (Mullen et al., 2009; Jones et al., 
2004). In relation to the intensity of the competitive state anxiety response, repressors 
reported both their cognitive and somatic state anxiety intensity to be significantly lower than 
the high-anxious and defensive high-anxious individuals. Importantly, the repressors did not 
differ significantly from the low-anxious individuals for either somatic or cognitive state 
anxiety intensity. In addition, the defensive high-anxious group did not differ significantly 
from the high-anxious group in cognitive or somatic state anxiety intensity. The lower level 
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of both cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity reported by repressors supports previous 
research (e.g., Jones et al., 2004). These differences are considered important for the data 
analysis, as without defensiveness, defensive high-anxious individuals are mistakenly 
classified as situationally high-anxious, and repressors as low-anxious. 
The repressors reported their cognitive and somatic anxiety to facilitate shooting 
performance compared to the defensive high-anxious and high-anxious group. This finding, 
again, is in support of the results of Jones et al. who showed that repressors demonstrated a 
cognitive bias to interpret anxiety as facilitative to performance. Both the high-anxious and 
defensive high-anxious shooters reported their somatic and cognitive anxiety to be 
significantly debilitative to performance. Jones et al. suggested that the comparison in the 
interpretation of directional anxiety is more valid when the state anxiety intensity is similar 
within two groups. As there were no significant differences between the repressor and low-
anxious groups, we are able to compare the directional interpretation of anxiety. Contrary to 
our predictions, the repressor group did not interpret their somatic anxiety to be more 
facilitative to their performance than the low-anxious group. The low levels of somatic 
anxiety intensity experienced could explain why they both reported facilitation to 
performance. This could be supported by previous research, which has found athletes report 
more facilitative symptoms when state anxiety is low (Lundqvist, et al., 2011). In line with 
our predictions, repressors also reported their cognitive anxiety to be facilitative to 
performance, whereas the low-anxious performers demonstrated no bias towards 
interpretation of anxiety. This finding does partially support the proposal that repressors 
cognitive defense mechanisms are involved in their interpretation of anxiety as facilitative.  
There were no significant differences in somatic and cognitive state anxiety intensity 
between the high-anxious and defensive high-anxious groups. This allows us to compare the 
prediction by Eysenck (1997) that defensive high-anxious performers have a similar 
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cognitive bias to high-anxious performers. Both groups reported their somatic and cognitive 
anxiety as debilitative to performance, supporting the findings of Eysenck and Derakshan 
(1997) and the prediction of Eysenck (1997) that both groups interpret stimuli as threatening. 
The importance of this finding is highlighted further by Eysenck’s (1997) suggestion that 
cognitive biases are more evident when state anxiety is high.  Therefore, the findings of this 
study suggest that the cognitive defense mechanisms in the interpretation of anxiety are 
similar between high-anxious and defensive high-anxious individuals.  
To date, limited sports research has been conducted based on Eysenck’s (1997) 
predictions for the influence of cognitive biases on future performance expectations. The 
second hypothesis relating to the influence of cognitive biases on future performance 
expectations was partially supported for the defensive high-anxious and repressor group. As 
predicted by Eysenck (1997) the repressor group were optimistic in their discrepancy 
between their actual and predicted performance compared to the defensive high-anxious 
shooters. It is assumed that repressors show biases that lead them to actively avoid threat-
related stimuli with Vigilance Avoidance Theory (VAT) suggesting that repressors utilize 
avoidant cognitive biases of the stimuli to experience absence of anxiety. VAT also predicts 
that repressors may show an initial attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli (e.g., 
external wind conditions; an important performance factor within fullbore rifle shooting), 
followed by a cognitive bias-related stimulus avoidance. This avoidance of the environmental 
conditions could lead to repressors missing important task-related information when asked to 
predict a future performance score. Interestingly, in line with our prediction, the defensive 
high-anxious group were pessimistic about their future performance. Although previous 
research has demonstrated that this group exhibit similar attentional and interpretive biases to 
high-anxious individuals (Derakshan and Eysenck, 1997), it is difficult to make theoretical 
predictions about how cognitive biases influence future performance predictions. Self-
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reported high trait-anxiety should be associated with attentional and interpretive biases. High 
levels of defensiveness would, however, be expected to be associated with opposite 
interpretive and attentional biases. The defensive high-anxious group had similar levels of 
both cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity and reported these symptoms as debilitative to 
performance. It may be that the defensive coping style is relatively ineffective as it does not 
prevent opposite biases and instead leads to pessimism about their ability to control future 
events. Further research is required within this area to develop our understanding of the 
cognitive biases within this group in particular. 
Eysenck’s (1997) theory also predicts that low-anxious individuals will be more 
realistic in their performance predictions due to the absence of cognitive biases. Our findings 
partially support this prediction as there was limited discrepancy between the actual and 
predicted performance, demonstrating an absence of cognitive biases. In contrast, the high-
anxious group were optimistic in their predictions compared to the defensive high-anxious 
group.  
Research investigating Eysenck’s (1997) predictions of the influence of cognitive 
biases on future performance predictions is limited to this study, Eysenck and Derakshan, 
(1997) and that of Jones et al., 2004. All three found different results for the high-anxious 
group. Eysenck and Derakshan examined the personality groups in an examination setting 
and found the high-anxious students to be overly pessimistic. In contrast, Jones et al. (2004) 
found no discrepancy between the predicted and actual performance. Both Eysenck and 
Derakshan, and Jones et al., suggested the reason why the predicted cognitive bias was not 
shown is due to situationally-relevant feedback of previous performance and current 
conditions. The effect of feedback could partially explain our findings within the high-
anxious group. Shooters made their performance predictions based on the immediate 
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environmental conditions and their position on the range. If any factor changed, it is likely 
that their predicted performance may have been different. The timing of the data collection 
could also provide an explanation for varying results between the three studies. Eysenck and 
Derakshan required participants to predict their performance two months prior to the 
examination, whereas Jones et al. collected performance predictions 30 minutes prior to the 
start of the golf matches, different to this study due to the individual requirements of the pre-
performance routines. Since Eysenck (1997) predicted that cognitive biases are influenced by 
the level of state anxiety the individual experiences and, since state anxiety is elevated closer 
to competition, the biases may be more evident in Jones et al.’s study. Within this study, 
although the repressor and defensive high-anxious groups were in line with Eysenck’s 
prediction of the cognitive bias they would demonstrate, statistical significance may have 
been reached if the data had been collected closer to the start of the competition. 
Defensive high-anxious participants are not always identified in anxiety research due 
to the less common combination of high trait anxiety and high defensiveness. Interestingly, 
however, there appears to be a higher proportion of defensive high-anxious individuals within 
clinical settings such as chronic musculoskeletal pain groups (e.g., Creswell & Chalder, 2001; 
Lewis, Fowler, Woby, & Holmes, 2012). Further research, recruiting larger initial samples, is 
warranted in order to investigate this group of individuals within performance/behavior 
prediction research.  
5.0 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study aimed to extend the work of Mullen et al. (2009) and Jones 
et al. (2004) by investigating the interpretation of anxiety as either facilitative or debilitative 
to individuals classified using Weinberger et al.’s taxonomy of individuals in a valid 
competitive sporting environment. In addition, the performance predictions between the four 
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personality groups were examined. Support was found for the prediction that repressors 
would perceive anxiety to be more facilitative to performance when compared to the other 
three groups. Due to similar levels of anxiety intensity we compared the directional 
interpretation of anxiety between the high-anxious and defensive high-anxious groups. 
Support was found for Eysenck’s (1997) prediction that defensive high-anxious individuals 
were similar to high-anxious individuals in their cognitive bias to report anxiety symptoms as 
debilitative to performance. The prediction that defensive high-anxious performers would be 
overly pessimistic in their score predictions and repressors would be optimistic was partially 
supported. The high-anxious group did not demonstrate the predicted cognitive bias and 
results also differed, in part, from previous research. It was suggested that, in relation to 
future performance expectations, both feedback and the timing of data collection could 
mediate the cognitive biases of high-anxious performers. Future research should also aim to 
investigate the influence of cognitive biases on performance and behavior predictions in 
sporting and clinical environments using Weinberger et al.’s classifications. 
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Figure 1. Mean cognitive and somatic state anxiety intensity scores (CSAI-2) for the four 
personality groups. Mean values for cognitive anxiety intensity: High-anxious: 25.5, (SD: ± 
6.5); Low-anxious: 13.3, (SD: ± 3.5); Repressor: 12.2, (SD: ± 2.4); Defensive high-anxious: 
26.4, (SD: ± 4.7). Mean values for somatic anxiety intensity: High-anxious: 18.8, (SD: ± 5.7); 
Low-anxious: 11.0, (SD: ± 1.6); Repressor: 11.1, (SD: ± 2.1); Defensive high-anxious: 20.9, 
(SD: ± 7.8). 
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Figure 2. Mean cognitive and somatic state anxiety direction scores for the four personality 
groups. Mean values for cognitive anxiety direction: High-anxious: -6.0, (SD: ±4.1); Low-
anxious: -0.1, (SD: ±8.0); Repressor: 2.6, (SD: ±10.1); Defensive high-anxious: -8.2 (SD: 
±6.2). Mean values for somatic anxiety direction: High-anxious: -6.2, (SD: ±5.4); Low-
anxious: 6.7, (SD: ±5.9); Repressor: 4.0, (SD: ±11.1); Defensive high-anxious: -4.2, (SD: 
±5.4).
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Figure 3. Graph showing score discrepancy (predicted score-actual score) for the high-
anxious, low-anxious, repressor and defensive high-anxious groups. (A positive score 
discrepancy is when a better performance is predicted than the actual score, e.g. optimism). 
Mean values: High-anxious: 0.48, (SD: ± 0.90); Low-anxious: 0.29, (SD: ± 0.52); Repressor: 
0.45, (SD: ±0.25); Defensive high-anxious: -0.17, (SD: ± 0.10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
